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ABSTRACT
ENERGY OPTIMIZATION AND COORDINATION FRAMEWORKS FOR SMART
HOMES CONSIDERING INCENTIVES FROM DISCOMFORT AND
MARKET ANALYSIS
PRITI PAUDYAL
2019
The electricity demand is increasing with the growing use of electricity-based
appliances in today’s world. The residential sector’s electricity consumption share is also
increasing. Demand response (DR) is a typical way to schedule consumers’ energy
consumption and help utility to reduce the peak load demand. Residential demand
management can contribute to reduce peak electric demand, decrease electricity costs, and
maintain grid reliability. Though the demand management has benefits to the utility and
the consumers, controlling the consumers electricity consumption provides inconvenience
to the consumers. The challenge here is to properly address the customers’ inconvenience
to encourage them to participate and meanwhile satisfy the required demand reduction
efficiently. In this work, new incentive-based demand management schemes for residential
houses are designed and implemented. This work investigates two separate DR
frameworks designed with different demand reduction coordination strategies.
The first framework design constitutes a utility, several aggregators, and residential
houses participating in DR program. Demand response potential (DRP), an indicator of
whether an appliance can contribute to the DR, guides the strategic allocation of the
demand limit to the aggregators. Each aggregator aggregates the DRP of all the
xii
controllable appliances under it and sends to the utility. The utility allocates different
demand limits to the aggregators based on their respective DRP ratios. Participating
residential customers are benefited with financial compensation with consideration of their
inconvenience. Two scenarios are discussed in this approach with DRP. One where the
thermostatically controlled loads (TCLs) are controlled. The thermal comfort of residents
and rewards are used to evaluate the demand response performance. The other scenario
includes the time-shiftable appliances control with the same framework.
The second framework is a three-level hierarchical control framework for
large-scale residential DR with a novel bidding scheme and market-level analysis. It
comprises of several residential communities, local controllers (LCs), a central
controller (CC), and the electricity market. A demand reduction bidding strategy is
introduced for the coordination among several LCs under a CC in this framework.
Incentives are provided to the participating residential consumers, while considering their
preferences, using a continuous reward structure. A simulation study on the 6-bus Roy
Billinton Test System with 1,200 residential consumers demonstrates the financial
benefits to both the electric utility and consumers.
1CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
The global electric energy demand is rising and is expected to rise in the coming
decades. The increase in electric demand, especially during peak hours, may threaten grid
reliability. To meet the increasing demand, a significant investment in the existing
infrastructures such as upgrading the transmission lines and increasing the generation
capacity are required. The generation capacity should be sufficiently maintained to meet
the peak demand of the system. Such peak demands occur for short period of time in a
year. In this context, to maintain the system reliability, utilities need to have a
considerable capital investment.
Traditionally, the electric energy demand was considered inflexible and the supply
followed the demand to balance the supply and demand of electricity. So, the utilities used
to vary the generation, turn the generating plants on or off or purchase power from other
utilities to match the supply and demand.Nowadays, the electric demand is considered
flexible such that it can be adjusted to match the supply. Thus, an alternative method,
termed demand response (DR) [1], is to change the consumers’ load pattern so that
demand during peak hours can be shifted. According to the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, DR is defined as [1]: “Changes in electric usage by end-use customers from
their normal consumption patterns in response to changes in the price of electricity over
time, or to incentive payments designed to induce lower electricity use at times of high
wholesale market prices or when system reliability is jeopardized.” DR can provide
financial benefits to the participating customers through electricity bill savings and/or
2incentives and reliability benefits to the power grid. Also, DR lowers the wholesale
electricity price by avoiding the operation of expensive generation plants which provides
market-wide financial benefits [1].
In recent years, there is an increasing concern about encouraging customer loads to
provide DR to improve the reliability and security of the power system. DR programs are
designed to encourage customers to reduce their load demand. It is reported that a five
percent reduction in peak demand through DR programs in the US could lead to $35
billion in savings over a 20 year period [2]. At present, several independent system
operators (ISOs)/regional transmission organizations (RTOs) (e.g., California ISO,
Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) RTO, etc.) and a number of utilities (e.g.,
Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE), etc.) in different
regions of the US have implemented different DR practices.
According to the US energy information administration, the residential electric
power consumption constitutes 38% of the total energy consumption in the US [3]. In
2015, the residential customer DR represented 26% of total potential peak demand
savings considering the existing DR programs in the US [4]. While for some regions such
as Alaska, Hawaii, Florida reliability coordinating council (FRCC), etc., the residential
demand reduction accounts for the majority of the total potential peak demand savings
(e.g., in FRCC, it accounts for approximately 49% of the potential peak demand savings).
Thus, there is a potential for the residential sector to contribute to the system-level demand
reduction, and smart home energy management is an important topic in the research area.
Generally, incentive-based and price-based are the common types of demand
management schemes [5], [6]. These are also referred as direct and indirect load control
3respectively. In price-based scheme, a time-varying tariff is offered to encourage the
consumers to change their electricity consumption pattern. Real-time pricing, critical-peak
pricing, and time-of-use (TOU) tariffs are the types of time-varying rates offered. In
incentive-based scheme, customers are requested to reduce their load upon request as per
a contractual agreement. While controlling the load with any of the above DR scheme, the
objective is balance energy and save costs for both the customers and the utility.
Customers seek to minimize their energy cost or maximize their benefits and the utility
aims to manage available energy accurately within minimum cost [7]. Though controlling
the customers’ load can provide incentives or reduce the electricity bill, it might affect the
resident’s comfort. Therefore, it is important to consider the consumers’ comfort while
implementing the DR programs. Otherwise, the customers could opt out of the programs.
The customers long-term participation is very crucial for the successful implementation of
such programs. Therefore, design of proper demand management scheme which motivates
customers to participate and ensures their comfort is a major challenge.
1.2 Objective
The objective of this thesis was to develop an incentive-based scalable residential
demand reduction approach which can benefit both the utility and the customers.
To achieve the objective, the specific tasks of this research were to:
(a) study and implement the residential appliances models which can be controlled for
demand response purpose,
(b) develop a demand reduction framework to control and coordinate several groups of
the thermostatically controlled appliances by minimizing consumers’ discomfort
4and providing them rewards,
(c) investigate the contribution of time-shiftable appliances in demand reduction
considering the associated inconvenience and provide compensation accordingly,
and
(d) develop a scalable hierarchical framework for demand reduction with proper
coordination method for a large number of customer appliances and consider the
market-level benefits.
1.3 Contributions and organization of this thesis
1.3.1 Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis are stated below:
(a) the development of demand reduction framework for controlling residential
appliances with demand response potential (DRP) while considering the consumers’
comfort and incentives,
(b) the introduction of a modified DRP to incorporate time-shiftable appliances and
compensation design based on the inconvenience due to shifting appliances,
(c) the implementation of a hierarchical control framework with a novel bidding
scheme to coordinate a large number of residential houses providing reward and
including market analysis, and
(d) the quantification of potential market-level benefits of the residential demand
reduction in terms of change in locational marginal price (LMP) and utility savings.
51.3.2 Thesis outline
This thesis is organized as follows: The study of the residential load models and
their implementation has been presented in Chapter 2. The operation of these modeled
controllable appliances are controlled to provide the demand management services in this
thesis work. In this chapter, the thermostatically controlled appliances as well as some
shiftable appliances models are implemented. In Chapter 3, the implementation of an
incentive-based demand management framework with the DR potential approach for
demand allocation has been discussed. Chapter 4 includes the detailed implementation of
large-scale demand management hierarchical framework with consideration of
market-level benefit. A new bidding strategy has been proposed for the coordination of
demand reduction among several local controllers in a three-layered hierarchical
framework. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the thesis and provides the possible future work.
6CHAPTER 2 RESIDENTIAL HOME ELECTRIC APPLIANCES MODEL
In this chapter, the major power consuming residential load models are discussed.
The individual power consumption profile for each appliance for a typical day is shown.
2.1 Residential Load Classification
Electricity is consumed in residential houses for different purposes and by different
appliances. According to the U.S. EIA in [8], space cooling accounts for the major
electricity consumption, which is 15% of the total share of residential sector electricity
consumption in the U.S. Space heating (14%) and water heating (12%) are the other major
electricity end use in residential sector. Similarly, lighting, refrigeration, cooking, cloth
dryer, cloth washer, etc. are other electricity uses in the residential houses, presented in
Table 2.1.
Table 2.1. U.S. residential sector electricity consumption by major end uses in 2018, as
projected in the Annual Energy Outlook 2019 [8]
End use Billion kWh Share of total
Space cooling 214 15%
Space heating 207 14%
Water heating 174 12%
Lighting 91 6%
Refrigeration 87 6%
Televisions and related equipment 62 4%
Cloth dryers 60 4%
Computers and related equipment 26 2%
Furnace fans and boiler circulation pumps 25 2%
Freezers 20 1%
Cooking 16 1%
Clothes washers 10 1%
Dishwashers 7 1%
Other uses 460 31%
Total consumption 1,462
7Generally, the residential loads are categorized into two categories: controllable and
non-controllable. The loads whose operation can be interrupted/shifted without affecting
the consumers’ daily lifestyle are categorized as controllable loads. The loads whose
operation cannot be interrupted/shifted are categorized as non-controllable loads.
Appliances such as heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC), electric water
heater (EWH), cloth washer, cloth dryer, cooking oven, and dishwasher are considered as
controllable loads in this thesis. These controllable loads are among the major electricity
consuming appliances and thus controlling the operation of these appliances help reduce
the peak electricity demand when required. It is important to identify the operating
characteristics of any load in order to control its function. Different loads are based on
different principles. For example, HVAC and EWH have thermostats which are turned ON
and OFF for temperature control, while cloth washers and dryers should function
continuously for a specified time. The model and operation of the controllable appliances
considered in this thesis are explained in this chapter.
2.2 HVAC Model
Several models for HVAC can be found in different works of literature such as [9].
In this system, HVAC model in [10] are used. An HVAC with a thermostat operates in an
ON/OFF way and at its rated power when turned ON. The thermostat setpoint will be
defined such that it turns ON and OFF around that temperature setpoint within a defined
deadband above and below the setpoint.
The room temperature estimation developed in [10] is given by (2.1).
8Ti+1 = Ti+∆T · Gi∆c +∆T ·
CAC
∆c
·WAC,i (2.1)
where,
Ti room temperature in time slot i (°F)
∆ T length of time slot i (hour)
Gi heat gain rate of the house during time slot i (Btu/h)
CAC cooling/heating capacity (Btu/h)
∆c energy needed to change the temperature of the air in the room by 1 °F
(Btu/°F)
WAC,i status of the AC unit in time slot i (0=OFF, 1= ON)
The calculation of the heat gain rate of a house given by [10] is presented as
Equation 2.2.
Gi = (
Awall
Rwall
+
Aceiling
Rceiling
+
Awindow
Rwindow
+
11.77Btu
°F× f t3 ×nac×Vhouse)× (Tout,i−Ti)
+SHGC×Awindows×Hsolar×
3.412BtuWh
10.76 f t
2
m2
+Hp (2.2)
where,
Awall area of wall
Rwall heat resistance of wall
Aceiling area of ceiling
Rceiling heat resistance of ceiling
Awindow area of window
Rwindow heat resistance of window
9Awindows area of south facing windows
nac number of air changes in each time slot i (1/h)
Vhouse house volume ( f t3)
Tout,i outdoor temperature in time slot i (°F)
Ti room temperature in time slot i (°F)
SHGC solar heat gain coefficient of windows
Hsolar solar radiation heat power (W/m2)
Hp heat gain from people (Btu/h)
For the implementation of the HVAC model, the following parameters shown in
Table 2.2 are used which has been taken from [11]. The typical room temperature for a
hot summer day obtained from the HVAC model is presented in Fig 2.1.
Table 2.2. Parameters for simulating a typical HVAC load.
Parameter Value
Vhouse 21312
CHVAC 33000
PHVAC 2.5
Awall 1564
Aceiling 2664
Awindow 228
Rwindow 2
Rceiling 32
Rwall 12
SHGC 0.67
Cair 0.0195
Tout 93.2
2.3 Electric Water Heater Model
The upper and lower limits for the hot water temperature are defined within which
the heating coils operate. When the hot water temperature falls below the lower limit, the
10
Figure 2.1. Room temperature for a typical summer day due to HVAC operation.
heating coils start to operate at its rated power until the temperature reaches the upper
limit. The upper limit defined in this research is 118.4 °F and the lower limit is 107.6 ° F,
which are the typical values. The revised model from [10] for the estimation of the water
temperature in the tank is presented as:
Toutlet,i+1 =
Toutlet,i(Vtank− fi ·∆t)
Vtank
+
Tinlet · fi ·∆t
Vtank
+
1gal
1lb
[PWH,i ·WWH,i · 3412BtukWh
− (Toutlet,i−Ta)
RTank
·Atank] · ∆t60minh
· 1
Vtank
(2.3)
where,
Tinlet temperature of inlet water (° F)
Ta room temperature (° F)
PWH,i ·WWH,i power consumed by water heater (kW)
fi hot water flow rate in time slot i (gpm)
Atank surface area of the tank ( f t2)
11
Vtank volume of the tank (gallons)
Rtank heat resistance of the tank (° F. area. h/Btu)
∆ t duration of each time slot (minutes)
For the implementation of the EWH model, the following parameters shown in
Table 2.3 are used which has been taken from [11]. The hot water temperature from the
EWH model is presented in Fig. 2.2.
Table 2.3. Parameters for simulating a typical EWH load.
Parameter Value
Vtank 80
f ri 3
PWH 4
Tinlet 68
ηWH 0.8
Atank 14
Rtank 16
Figure 2.2. Water temperature for a typical day due to EWH operation.
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2.4 Time-shiftable Appliances
In this system, each residential house consists of five smart appliances whose
operation can be shifted considering their nature. Shiftable appliances have the
characteristics that they operate continuously once started and they cannot be interrupted.
The shiftable appliances considered are cloth washer, cloth dryer, dishwasher, and cooking
oven. Since the cooking task is performed twice in a day, one for the breakfast and the
other for dinner, we consider the oven as two separate appliances, i.e., oven-1 and oven-2.
The operating characteristics of the appliances are presented in Table 2.4, which is adopted
from [12]. For instance, the oven-1 for breakfast has to be operated for half an hour and it
consumes 1.28 kW power. The typical operating time for the oven-1 is within 6:00 AM to
7:30 AM. The power consumption of these appliances vary within their operation time as
presented in [12], while for simplicity, it is considered that the appliances consume the
maximum power throughout their operation. Shifting the operating time for these
appliances compared to the base schedule can reduce the peak electricity consumption.
Changing an appliance’s use time can bring inconvenience to the consumers. Thus, the
inconvenience that can arise due to the shifting mechanism is considered in this work.
Table 2.4. Operating characteristics of shiftable appliances
Appliance Operation hours (h) Power (kW ) Typical operation time range
Oven-1 0.5 1.28 6:00 AM to 7:30 AM
Cloth washer 0.75 0.65
7:00 AM to 8:15 AM,
6:00 PM to 8:00 PM
Cloth dryer 1 2.97
8:00 AM to 10:00 AM,
7:00 PM to 10:00 PM
Oven-2 1.5 2.35 6:00 PM to 7:30 PM
Dishwasher 2.5 1.2 8:15 PM to 11:00 AM
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CHAPTER 3 RESIDENTIAL DEMAND MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
COORDINATING SMART APPLIANCES WITH DEMAND
RESPONSE POTENTIAL
3.1 Overview
The residential sector’s energy consumption share is increasing in recent years. DR
is a typical way to schedule consumers’ energy consumption and help utility to reduce the
peak load demand. Demand management programs help utilities to reduce the load
demand during high wholesale electricity price or system peak periods to maintain the
system reliability and operational security. Several studies have provided different solution
approach for the demand management. However, very few studies explored the demand
reduction with consumer incentives for motivation and the long-term participation. The
challenge here is to properly address the customers’ inconvenience to encourage them to
participate and meanwhile satisfy the required demand reduction efficiently.
In recent years, various demand management approaches and algorithms have been
proposed. In [13], home energy management system (HEMS) was formulated as a binary
linear programming problem where optimization was performed when the demand
reduction messages were received. A distributed real-time algorithm was proposed in
[14], where dual decomposition technique was employed to solve the temporally-spatially
coupled energy optimization problem. In [15]–[19], the objective was to find the optimal
operation time of appliances to satisfy the demand reduction. In these works, the
optimization algorithms focused on reducing the load and electricity costs and did not
discuss on the inconvenience caused to the customers, which could discourage customers
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to participate in the energy management programs. Some works consider the integration
with inter-connected microgird and battery systems for the demand reduction [20], [21].
Rooftop photovoltaic (PV) system is another way to meet the peak demand by generating
electricity from the demand side in [22]. However, the rooftop PV systems will not be
able to support the evening peak demand. References [23] and [24] presented the
integration of both the demand response and rooftop PV. In [23], the air conditioning and
mechanical ventilation fans are controlled during the time when PV generation is reduced.
It also incorporates energy storage and load shedding to compensate the solar PV
intermittency. In [24], electric vehicle and EWH are controlled for a smart household with
a rooftop PV system integrated with an energy storage system. Both of these references
developed their algorithms for a single house only.
Coordinated control of large number of smart appliances was proposed in [25]. The
demand limit was allocated to several agents based on the concept of DRP. Only the TCLs
and electric vehicles were controlled and the consumers were not provided with any kind
of incentives for their participation. In [26], the authors proposed a framework for
aggregating residential demands where they rewarded the participating consumers based
on their thermal comfort level. The technique for sharing of demand reduction among the
aggregators was not developed.
In summary, a single framework for exploring the flexibility of different residential
appliances to contribute to demand reduction considering a) the inconvenience to
consumers, b) compensating the consumers based on their inconvenience, and c)
coordinating number of appliances to achieve the desired demand reduction, has not been
investigated in the literature. This chapter proposes a new incentive-based DR program for
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residential houses based on a coordinated two-level optimization framework. Here, only
the appliances which are actually operating will participate in the proposed
incentive-based demand response programs. DRP of any appliance implies that the
appliance is working and has the potential to contribute to demand response. In this
approach, the utility sends command and consumption limit to several LCs to perform the
energy optimization. Participating customers are benefited with financial compensation
along with minimized privacy concerns in the proposed centralized framework. A mixed
integer linear programming (MILP) algorithm is employed to optimize the residential
appliances. The thermal comfort of resident is evaluated using CI, inconvenience due to
appliance shifting is minimized and compensated and rewards are used to evaluate the
demand response performance. Two separate tasks are proposed in this chapter: One
presents the residential demand management approach controlling the TCLs. Other one
achieves the demand management by controlling/shifting the operation of time-shiftable
appliances.
In the proposed first task, the demand response program is designed for controlling
the TCLs. The residents’ comforts are given different level of importance by using a CI.
Rewards are also allocated based on this CI. Residents are rewarded with certain
incentives to motivate them for long-term participation. Users’ preferences of thermal
home electric appliances and their willingness to go beyond the preferred limits are taken
as input for the proposed system.
In the second task, an incentive-based demand management scheme for
schedulable/time-shiftable appliances in a residential community is introduced. This
scheme is designed to provide scalability to the system. Different from existing literature,
16
a new compensation design is adopted for the shifting of task-based appliances based on
the level of inconvenience. The potentials of the schedulable appliances to contribute
during the demand reduction event are assessed with a modified DRP. Instead of
controlling the time-shiftable appliances of a single home in literature, the proposed
approach simultaneously considers the scheduling of time-shiftable appliances of a
community together. Considering different demand reduction events within a month, the
electricity bill with the proposed scheme is compared with the electricity bill from
time-of-use (TOU) tariff-based optimization scheme and also with the base case (i.e.,
without any energy optimization scheme).
3.2 System description
The proposed system consists of a two-level structure with a main central controller
(CC), local controllers (LCs), and residential houses as shown in Fig. 3.1. The utility or
the electricity supplier can be considered as the main controller which is responsible for
allocating the demand limit. There are certain number of residential houses under each
LC. They collect information on electricity consumption of the houses in the group and
issue control signals to optimize their electricity use. LCs send their DRP to the CC, and
the CC offers corresponding demand limit signals. The LCs take care of residents’
comfort based on residents’ preferences over their appliances. Bi-directional
communication is assumed between the CC and LCs and between the LCs and residential
smart appliances.
In order to meet the peak demand, utility with limited capacity has to buy electricity
at high prices. Managing the residential electricity use or curtailing certain loads
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Figure 3.1. System structure of two-level coordination and control.
selectively can prevent the utility from buying electricity at high prices, which is a part of
DR program. However, residents may not be willing to participate in such programs but
facilitating them with incentives can motivate to participate. The utility will still be in
profit despite providing incentives to the participants, as only a small amount has to be
shared as rewards to the participants. If a utility predicts, before a day or some hours
ahead, that there is peak demand at some hours of a day, it will declare DR event to the
LCs and the participating residents.
Fig. 3.2 depicts the general flowchart for the two-level structure. In the upper level,
there is an exchange of information between the utility (CC) and the LCs. In the lower
level, LCs get the information on residents’ preferences and they issue optimal strategies
to control/shift the residential appliances. The utility, acting as the CC, quantifies the total
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Figure 3.2. Overall system flowchart of two-level coordination and optimization.
amount of demand that has to be reduced for some times of the day and calculates the total
power consumption limit for the active appliances in all the residential houses under
consideration. As the LCs provide their respective aggregated DRP, the utility allocates
the power consumption limit to the LCs based on their DRP ratio. Then, the LCs perform
optimization to maintain the power limit of smart appliances while keeping in mind the
residents’ comfort or inconvenience. The CC is responsible for distributing the reward to
the residents through the LCs.
3.2.1 Controllable appliances
The smart residential appliances which are controlled to contribute to the demand
reduction in this work are explained. Two categories of appliances, i.e., TCLs and
time-shiftable appliances, are defined based on their nature of operation.
Thermostatically controlled loads (TCLs): The TCLs (HVAC and EWH) models
described in Chapter 2 are used in this project. HVAC and EWH can be turned ON/OFF to
manage the power consumption with almost negligible impact on the residents.
Time-shiftable appliances: The time-shiftable appliances described in Chapter 2,
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i.e., cloth washer, cloth dryer, dishwasher, and cooking oven are used in this work.
Schedulable or time-shiftable appliances have the characteristics that they operate
continuously once started and they cannot be interrupted in the middle of their operation.
The operation of these appliances can be shifted ahead or delayed to respond to the
demand reduction event.
3.2.2 Comfort indicator and inconvenience factor
Comfort indicator for TCLs: Comfort indicator (CI) is a measurement for thermal
comfort level of participants. At the same time, it is also a factor based on which the
available appliances are selected to participate in DR [26]. CI is actually the distance
between the current temperature status and the ideal temperature defined. CI is given by:
CIa =
∣∣∣∣∣2Ta−T lowa −T highaT higha −T lowa
∣∣∣∣∣ (3.1)
where, for appliance a (e.g., HVAC or EWH), Ta is the instantaneous temperature, T
high
a is
the upper temperature bound for normal operation, and T lowa is the lower temperature
bound for normal operation.
CI is always positive since it is defined as the absolute value only. If the value of CI
is less than or equal to 1, then the residents are comfortable while the residents are
uncomfortable (out of their defined preferences), if CI exceeds 1.
Inconvenience factor for time-shiftable appliances: Whenever any appliance has to
be operated at any other time than the initially-decided schedule, this creates
inconvenience to the user. The resulting inconvenience may discourage the customers to
participate in the energy optimization programs. To address the inconvenience caused by
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the shifting operation, an inconvenience factor is introduced. Inconvenience refers to the
advance or delay in the appliance operation, which is given by [27] as presented in
Equation (3.2),
Ia =
∣∣∣∣∣ τ∑t=t ′ t · (Sopta,t −Sbla,t)
∣∣∣∣∣ (3.2)
where, Ia is the inconvenience due to shifting of appliance a, Sa,topt is the optimal
ON/OFF status of the appliance a at time t after optimization, Sa,tbl is the consumer’s
baseline ON/OFF status for appliance a at time t, and t ′ and τ are the start time and end
time considered within which the loads are shifted.
3.2.3 Demand response potential
Demand response potential is an indication whether an appliance is in working
condition and has the potential to turn OFF in response to the DR signal issued by a
controller [28]. DRP signal 0 indicates the appliance has no potential to contribute to the
DR. DRP signal 1 implies the appliance is active and can respond to the DR signal.
Considering an HVAC, it will have DRP if it’s ON and the room temperature is between
the upper temperature and lower temperature limit. Considering an EWH, it will have
DRP if it’s ON and the water temperature is between the upper temperature and lower
temperature limit.
For time instance t+1, the DRP signals of HVAC and EWH depend on the status
and temperature from previous time t, as defined:
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PotiAC(t+1) =

1, stiAC(t) = ON and
T lowiAC ≤ TiAC(t)≤ T
high
iAC
0, otherwise.
(3.3)
where, PotiAC(t+1) is the DRP signal for resident i’s HVAC for time t+1, stiAC(t) is the
status of HVAC of resident i during time t, TiAC(t) is resident i’s room temperature at time
t, T lowiAC is the lower limit for resident i’s room temperature (°F), and T
high
iAC is the upper limit
for resident i’s room temperature (°F).
PotiWH (t+1) =

1, stiWH (t) = ON and
T lowiWH ≤ TiWH (t)≤ T
high
iWH
0, otherwise.
(3.4)
where, PotiWH (t+1) is the DRP signal for resident i’s EWH for time t+1, from stiWH (t) is
the status of EWH of resident i during time t, TiWH (t) is resident i’s hot water temperature
at time t, T lowiWH is the lower limit for resident i’s hot water temperature (°F), and T
high
iWH is the
upper limit for resident i’s hot water temperature (°F).
LCs calculate their total DRP by multiplying DRP signals with the rated power of
respective appliances. The total potential is sent to the CC and based on the DRP ratio of
each LC, the power limit is allocated. The total DRP of each LC for each time step is
calculated as [28]:
DRPtotal =
n
∑
i=1
PiAC ·PotiAC +
n
∑
i=1
PiWH ·PotiWH (3.5)
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where, PiAC is the rated power of resident i’s HVAC (kW), PiWH is the rated power of
resident i’s EWH (kW), and n is the total number of residents/houses under a LC.
The power limit allocated by the CC to each LC for each time step is calculated by
using the following equation as presented by [28]:
Pklimit = p
k
AC + p
k
WH−
DRPktotal
∑Kk=1 DRPktotal
(
K
∑
k=1
(pkAC + p
k
WH)−PLimit) (3.6)
where, Pklimit is the power limit allocated to a LC k, p
k
AC is the total power consumed by the
HVACs of all residents under LC k (kW), pkWH is the total power consumed by the EWHs
of all residents under LC k (kW), DRPktotal is the total DRP of LC k (kW), K is the total
number of LCs, and PLimit is the total power consumption limit considering all the houses
in the system.
This DRP concept is directly applicable to TCLs or the appliances which can be
turned ON/OFF instantly without affecting their behavior. So, a modified DRP approach
is designed to estimate the DRP of time-shiftable appliances, which is explained below.
Modified DRP for time-shiftable appliances: A modified definition for the
estimation of DRP is introduced in this work. Instead of defining the potential signal of an
appliance based on its ON/OFF status every time step in the literature, it is considered that
an appliance has the potential if its starting time is within the given demand reduction
period. This means any appliance which is in operation within the demand reduction
period does not necessarily have the potential. Only those appliances which start within
the defined demand reduction period have the potential and only these appliances are
controlled (shifted) to satisfy the demand reduction. An appliance whose starting time is
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ahead of the given demand reduction event time does not have the potential, even though
it’s operating within the event time period. This is because of the characteristics that a
time-shiftable appliance cannot be interrupted in the middle of its operation. The two
advantages of this modified method of estimating the DRP are: (i) Instead of including all
the time-shiftable appliances into the optimization, only the potential appliances
participate in the optimization. This reduces the computation complexity to some extent
since with the decrease in number of appliances, the number of variables decreases. (ii)
The total DRP for whole time-frame is available beforehand and so the optimization is
performed for the whole time-frame rather than each time step, which is suitable for
time-shiftable appliances. The modified way of accessing the DRP signal of an appliance
a at time t is mathematically presented in Equation (3.7).
Pota,t =

1, DRstart ≤ starta ≤ DRend and Sbla,t = 1
0, otherwise.
(3.7)
where, Pota,t is the DRP signal of an appliance a at time t, DRstart is the demand
reduction start time, DRend is the demand reduction end time, and starta is the start time of
appliance a.
For example, let us consider two appliances A and B. Appliance A operates from 4
to 5 PM and B from 4:30 to 5:15 PM. If the demand reduction event is from 4:30 PM to
5:30 PM then appliance A does not have DRP while B has the DRP, i.e., the DRP signal of
appliance B is 1 from 4:30 PM to 5:15 PM. Since the appliance A will start before the start
of the demand reduction event, it’s operation cannot be interrupted. So, its DRP is 0 for
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the given demand reduction event and it will not be included in the optimization, i.e., it is
allowed to run in its original schedule. Since appliance B’s starting time is within the
given demand reduction period, it has the DRP. So, the appliance B participates in the
optimization and its schedule might be shifted to maintain the demand limit. In the system
where the time-shiftable appliances are controlled, the controllers calculate their total
DRP for each time step by multiplying DRP potential signal with the rated power of
respective appliances and adding them all, i.e., using the Equation (3.8).
DRPktotal =
A
∑
a=1
Pka ·Potka (3.8)
where, Pka is the rated power of appliance a under LC k, Pot
k
a is the DRP signal (1/0)
of appliance a under LC k, and A is the total number of appliances under controller k.
All the LCs send their corresponding aggregated DRPs to the CC and based on the
DRP ratio of each LC, the CC allocates the power limit for each time step. Equation (3.9)
is used by the CC to calculate the power limit to each LC.
Pklimit = p
k
b+
A
∑
a=1
pka−
DRPktotal
∑Kk=1 DRPktotal
(
K
∑
k=1
(pkb+
A
∑
a=1
pka)−PLimit) (3.9)
where, for a LC k, Pklimit is the demand limit (kW ), p
k
b is the total base power
consumed (kW ), pka is the power consumed by appliance a under the LC k (kW ), K is the
total number of LCs, and PLimit is the total power limit to be allocated by the utility (kW ).
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3.2.4 Multilevel reward and compensation scheme
In this section, the reward structure offered to the consumers for controlling their
TCLs and the incentive compensation offered for shifting the time-shiftable appliances
respectively are discussed.
Reward for controlling TCLs: Multilevel reward rate structure offered for
controlling the TCLs consists of three different reward rates, R1, R2, and R3 as shown in
Equation 3.10, defined in [26]. Reward rate R1 is provided if residents are participating in
the DR program and they are within their comfort. R2 is provided if the participating
residents are out of their comfort and they are willing to compromise to go beyond their
comfort for certain time. R3 is given when participants are out of comfort, but they are not
willing to compromise to go beyond. R3 reward rate is higher than R2 and R2 is higher
than R1. R1 rate is very common and all the participants are equally rewarded at this rate.
R3 rate is very rare, only for emergency cases, so there is very few chance of rewarding
with R3 rate.
RWRi =

R1, if CIi ≤ 1
R2, if CIi > 1 and Comi = 1
R3, if CIi > 1 and Comi = 0
(3.10)
where, CIi is the CI value for resident i and Comi is the resident i’s willingness to
compromise to go beyond his/her preferences.
Compensation design for time-shiftable appliances: In the system where the
time-shiftable appliances are controlled, consumers are provided with incentives
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compensation which has been designed based on the inconvenience level. Different
compensation rates are assigned for the appliances according to the hours shifted from the
original schedule. The inconvenience to the user increases when the appliance operation is
scheduled much ahead or much later than the original schedule. Table 3.1 presents the
compensation design. Incentives compensation is 0, if there is no shifting.
Table 3.1. Incentives compensation rates according to shifted hours
Time shift condition Compensation rate ($/kWh)
No shift c = 0
time shift ≤ 1 hour c =C1
1 hour <time shift ≤ 2 hour c =C2
time shift >2 hour c =C3
If any appliance is shifted within 1 hour then the compensation rate C1 is provided.
Similarly, if the shift is greater than 1 hour and within 2 hour, then C2 compensation rate is
applied. Moreover, if the shift is greater than 2 hour then C3 compensation rate is given.
Compensation rate C3 is the highest. The compensation rate increases with the increasing
inconvenience, i.e., inconvenience is influenced by the shifted hours.
3.3 Demand management framework implementation with DRP approach
The two-level framework presented in this chapter has been implemented in two
ways. First, the TCLs are controlled to achieve the demand reduction. Second,
time-shiftable appliances are controlled to satisfy the demand reduction. In this section,
the demand management algorithms for controlling the TCLs and the time-shiftable
appliances respectively are explained in detail.
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3.3.1 Thermostatically controlled appliances control and coordination with DRP concept
In this section, the optimization problem formulation for the control of TCLs in the
hierarchical framework is discussed.
Objective function in the lower level for control of TCLs
In the lower level, each LC performs optimization in order to maintain the total
power consumption (for the houses under its control) within its limit. The flowchart for
the lower level optimization is presented in Fig. 3.3. First, the DRP of the appliances are
evaluated. The expected total power consumption by the potential appliances is calculated
which is compared with the power consumption limit. If it exceeds the consumption limit,
then optimization is done to control the appliances (with potential) so that the total power
consumption limit is not violated. Next, the control is issued to update the status of the
appliances. Reward is calculated according to the contribution of each house. The room
temperature as well as the hot water temperature are estimated each time. The increased
or decreased temperatures after estimation are checked whether they are within residents’
preferences or not, and the possible change in appliances’ status are recorded. Again with
the estimated status of appliances, the DRP is evaluated and the cycle repeats until the
desired end time. If the time has reached the end time for DR event, then the optimization
ends and the appliances return to their normal operation.
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Figure 3.3. Lower level optimization flowchart.
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Furthermore, to ensure better comfort to the residents, some extra considerations are
adopted. If any appliance is just ON at time t, it is not considered to have DRP for time
t+1. However, at some point, there may be large number of such appliances which leads
to the condition where the total power consumption of such appliances exceeds the power
limit. In such case, these appliances are sorted according to their CI values. Appliance
with lowest CI value among them will be included in optimization (will be set to have
potential) first. Then, the reduced total power consumption of those appliances is
compared with the power limit. If it’s still above the limit, then another appliance with
lowest CI value will be included for optimization and so on.
Specifically, the goal here is to minimize the total reward amount as well as the CI.
This means minimizing the CI maximizes participants’ comfort level while minimizing
the total reward reduces the cost to the utility. The objective function of a LC is:
min
δiAC ,δiWH
wi ·
n
∑
i=1
RWi+w′i ·
n
∑
i=1
CIi (3.11)
where,
wi ·
n
∑
i=1
RWi = wiAC ·RWiAC +wiWH ·RWiWH , for i = 1 to n (3.12)
RWiAC = PiAC(1−δ iAC) ·RWRiAC , for i = 1 to n (3.13)
RWiWH = (1−δiWH ) ·RWRiWH , for i = 1 to n (3.14)
and,
w′i ·
n
∑
i=1
CIi = w′iAC ·CIiAC +w′iWH ·CIiWH , for i = 1 to n (3.15)
30
and,
CIiAC =
∣∣∣∣∣2TiAC −T lowiAC −T
high
iAC
T highiAC −T lowiAC
∣∣∣∣∣ , for i = 1 to n (3.16)
CIiWH =
∣∣∣∣∣2TiWH −T lowiWH −T
high
iWH
T highiWH −T lowiWH
∣∣∣∣∣ , for i = 1 to n (3.17)
Meanwhile, wiAC +w
′
iAC = 1 and wiWH +w
′
iWH = 1
subject to the constraints given by the following Equations: (3.18), (3.19), and
(3.20) and the HVAC and EWH model equations presented in Chapter 2.
n
∑
i=1
PiAC ·δiAC +
n
∑
i=1
PiWH ·δiWH ≤ Pklimit (3.18)
T lowiAC ≤ TiAC ≤ T
high
iAC (3.19)
T lowiWH ≤ TiWH ≤ T highiWH (3.20)
where, wiAC , wiWH , w
′
iAC , and w
′
iWH are the weight factors, and δiAC and δiWH
respectively are the statuses (1/0) of the HVAC and EWH of the resident i.
Note: In the equations for the HVAC and EWH models from Chapter 2, the status
variables WAC and WWH respectively are replaced by δAC and δWH respectively when used
in this work.
The objective function and constraints in this work are linear and the decision
variables, the statuses of the appliances, should be integers. Thus, MILP is chosen for the
optimization in this problem.
31
3.3.2 Time-shiftable appliances control and coordination with modified DRP concept
In this section, the optimization problem formulation for controlling the operation of
time-shiftable appliances is explained. The objective of a LC’s optimization problem,
constraints involved, input data for the optimization algorithm, variables, and output, and
the solution approach are presented.
Objective function
Each LC performs optimization in order to maintain the total power consumption
(for the houses under its control) within its limit. After the CC allocates the demand limit,
each LC performs its own optimization with the objective to minimize the total
compensation payment and inconvenience to the customers.
The LC’s optimization objective is represented by Equation (3.21),
min
Sopta,t , za,t
A
∑
a=1
RWa+w ·
A
∑
a=1
Ia (3.21)
where,
RWa = c · pa ·da (3.22)
RWa is the compensation amount received for shifting appliance a, w is the weighed
factor for the inconvenience, pa is the power consumed by appliance a, and da is the time
in hour for which the appliance a is operated. za,t is a binary variable defined in the
constraints below.
Optimization constraints
Since the shiftable appliances are used in the optimization, several constraints
32
associated with these appliances such as continuous operation constraint and running
order constraint should be considered. The operation hours refer to the total time an
appliance will be in operation, once it’s started. The constraints are formulated as below.
Available power constraint: The total power consumed by all the appliances at any
time should be within the power limit available for that particular time.
A
∑
a=1
Pa ·Sopta,t + pkb,t ≤ Pklimit,t , for t = t ′ to T (3.23)
where, pkb,t is the total base power consumed under the controller k (kW).
Minimum run time constraint: It is considered that any shiftable appliance will have
fixed operating time as explained in Chapter 2. So, the constraint (3.24) ensures that the
appliance a operates for its specified time.
T
∑
t=t ′
Sopta,t = da, for a = 1 to A (3.24)
Continuous operation constraint: The shiftable appliances considered should not be
interrupted during their operation. Constraint (3.25) ensures the continuous operation of
appliance a.
T
∑
t=t ′
Sopta,t+1−Sopta,t − za,t ≤ 0, for a = 1 to A (3.25)
where, za,t is a binary variable such that:
za,t =

1 if t is the start time of appliance a
0 otherwise.
(3.26)
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Running order constraint: Some appliances are dependent on some other
appliances. For instance, cloth dryer can only be operated after the washer completes its
operation. For such kind of dependent appliance, additional constraint is employed as
Equation (3.27),
startu ≥ startv+dv+gap (3.27)
where, startu is the start time of appliance u, startv is the start time of appliance v, and gap
is the minimum time interval considered between the end of operation of appliance u and
the start of appliance v.
Solution approach with MILP: The optimization problem is solved by MILP
approach. The objective function and the constraints in the optimization problem are
linear. The main decision variables are the statuses of the appliances and binary variable
za,i. Here, all the decision variables are the integer variables, so MILP algorithm is the
best fit for the problem.
Figure 3.4. Schematic of MILP optimization for shiftable appliances.
The input to the MILP algorithm are the rated power, operating duration, base case
statuses of the appliances, three compensation rates, and the available power limit for the
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considered time period. The output from the optimization are the values for the new
statuses, start times, optimal (selected) compensation rates for each appliance, and
inconvenience for each appliance. Fig. 3.4 presents the schematic of the optimization
process.
3.4 Experimental setup and results discussion
3.4.1 Simulation settings and results with TCLs
This section presents the simulation settings for the optimization for controlling
TCLs under the two-level system. In this case, the DR program is implemented for two
LC system with ten houses under each LC. A case study for reducing 15 kW demand for
20 minutes is presented here.
Considering HVAC and EWH loads, reward rates are defined with different reward
amounts. For HVAC, different HVACs have different power consumption, so the reward is
awarded in cents per kW basis for each time step as defined in [26].
RWRiAC =

4 cents/kW, if CIiAC ≤ 1
8 cents/kW, if CIiAC > 1 and ComiAC = 1
12 cents/kW, if CIiAC > 1 and ComiAC = 0
(3.28)
For EWH, all EWHs are considered to be of same capacity. So, all EWHs are of 4
kW and reward is awarded in cents only. Here, the reward amount is estimated considering
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the highest reward amount that can be obtained from the largest capacity HVAC provided.
RWRiWH =

6.4 cents, if CIiWH ≤ 1
12.8 cents, if CIiWH > 1 and ComiWH = 1
19.2 cents, if CIiWH > 1 and ComiWH = 0
(3.29)
The users’ preference profiles for HVAC for ten houses under one of the LCs are
revised from [26] as listed in Table 3.2. Note some of the parameters are altered to create
slightly different profiles for the ten houses under the second LC in Table 3.2. Likewise,
the users’ profile for EWH is generated with some typical values in Table 3.3. Different
HVACs have different power ratings ranging from 1.1 kW to 1.6 kW while all the EWHs
are of 4 kW power ratings. The total demand is 53.6 kW each for both LCs. All houses
are considered identical with the same house parameters required for the HVAC model
and EWH model as obtained from [11]. The simulation considers summer time and the
ambient temperature is taken as 93.2°F. All of the appliances are considered to be in
working condition.
Table 3.2. Users’ profile with preferences for HVAC (revised from [26])
Profile for HVACs under LC-1 Profile for ACs under LC-2
House
No.
TH (° F) TL (° F) PAC(kW )
Initial
temp (° F)
Com
Initial
status
House
No.
TH(° F) TL(° F) PAC(kW )
Initial
temp (° F)
Com
Initial
status
1 75 70 1.3 72.5 0 1 1 78 70 1.3 72.5 0 0
2 75 70 1.4 72.5 1 1 2 75 68 1.4 72.5 1 1
3 75 65 1.2 71.8 0 0 3 75 65 1.2 71.8 0 0
4 77 70 1.5 73.2 0 1 4 77 70 1.5 73.2 0 1
5 75 65 1.6 73 1 1 5 75 65 1.6 73 1 1
6 75 65 1.3 71.6 1 1 6 75 68 1.3 71.6 1 1
7 75 67 1.2 72.3 0 0 7 75 67 1.2 72.3 0 0
8 77 70 1.1 73.5 1 1 8 79 70 1.1 74 1 1
9 77 65 1.5 72 0 1 9 77 65 1.5 72 0 1
10 75 70 1.5 72.5 1 1 10 75 70 1.5 72.5 1 1
For the Tables I and II, PAC is the HVAC power consumption in kW, com is the
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Table 3.3. Users’ profile with preferences for EWH
Profile for EWHs under LC-1 Profile for EWHs under LC-2
House
No.
TH (° F) TL (° F) Com
Usage
(gallon/min)
Initial
temp (° F)
Initial
status
House
No.
TH
(° F
TL
(° F)
Com
Usage
(gallon/min)
Initial
temp (° F)
Initial
status
1 120 105 1 3 113.5 1 1 122.5 105 1 3 113.5 1
2 125 100 1 3 110 1 2 125 100 1 3 110 1
3 120 102 1 3 107.7 1 3 120 102 1 3 107.7 1
4 129 105 0 3 115 0 4 129 103 0 3 115 0
5 122 99 1 3 113.7 0 5 122 99 1 3 113.7 1
6 127 100 0 3 107.5 0 6 124 105 0 3 107.7 1
7 120 96 1 3 109.9 0 7 120 103 0 3 117.2 0
8 130 105 1 3 116.1 1 8 130 105 1 3 116.1 1
9 120 98 1 3 109 0 9 127 98 1 3 109 1
10 125 104 0 3 112 1 10 125 104 1 3 112 1
willingness to compromise, T H is the user preference for high temperature limit (° F), and
T L is the user preference for low temperature limit (° F). For the optimization, the weight
factor wiAC is taken as 0.8 and w
′
iAC as 0.2 for HVAC loads while the weight factors are
wiWH = 0.4 and w
′
iWH = 0.6 for EWH loads. These weight factors were chosen as suitable
for the case studies performed. The effect of varying weight factors has not been explored
here. The optimization is performed for each time step (each minute) using MATLAB
software.
15 kW demand reduction for 20 minutes In this case, 15 kW demand has to be
reduced (from what is being consumed right at the moment) for the next 20 minutes. From
the users’ profile, the appliances power consumption at the beginning is 73.1 kW and here
15 kW has to be deducted which means the total power consumption limit is 58.1 kW.
This power consumption limit is divided between the two LCs according to their DRP
ratio. The optimization in the lower level is conducted according to the power limit issued
by the upper level.
Table 3.4 shows the result in terms of total power consumption and reward to be
distributed per minute. The total power consumption per minute is always below the limit,
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i.e., 58.1 kW. The reward amount is less in the first few minutes since some of the
appliances were already in OFF state prior to the start of demand response. They were
included in demand response event only after they turned ON. This is because they were
OFF according to their normal operation. However, in general case, some appliances may
not be in working condition if they are not consuming power at the start of demand
response event though all appliances are considered working in this case study. From the
total power consumption shown in the table, it can be noticed that there is a drop in the
total power at time step 16. Since most of the appliances were turned OFF until time step
15, they remained in OFF state until the temperatures hit the bound. In addition, some
other appliances were also turned OFF due to their normal operating cycle during the time
step 16. Meanwhile, since the total power consumption was below the demand limit for
this time step. optimization was not performed. This is the reason for the sudden drop in
power consumption. Also, the reward provided was high for this time step because the
appliances get the reward when they are in OFF state. For the next time step, some of the
appliances had already hit/cross the temperature bound and they came to ON state. So, the
total power consumption increased compared to previous time step. The reward provided
in this time step is a little bit higher than previous step because more number of appliances
had hit the bound at this time step due to which they were provided with R2 reward rate.
The utility has to pay $21.70 as total reward amount for this particular demand response
event.
Table 3.5 presents the result for minimum and maximum temperature attained,
comfort percentage, and reward amount received by each house under LC-1 during this
demand response event. For instance, the minimum and maximum room temperature
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Table 3.4. Result in terms of total power consumption and reward
Time(minute) Total power consumption (kW) Reward ($)
1 55.6 0.32
2 55.6 0.32
3 55.6 0.32
4 51.4 0.48
5 48.8 0.68
6 53.8 0.74
7 53.8 0.80
8 57.8 0.80
9 56.6 0.98
10 50.8 1.21
11 55.6 1.34
12 54.7 1.33
13 54.7 1.33
14 57.3 1.42
15 52 1.54
16 18.5 2.01
17 29 2.10
18 57.7 1.12
19 55.2 1.31
20 57.5 1.54
obtained for house 1 are 70.15°F and 74.76°F respectively which lie within the lower and
upper room temperature preferences of house 1 i.e., 70°F and 75°F . So, the CI is always
less than 1 and 100% comfort has been achieved. On the other hand, the minimum
attained hot water temperature, 103.67°F , has fallen beyond the lower preference (105°F)
and so the CI exceeds 1. Thus, only 90% comfort, related to hot water temperature, was
achieved during this 20 minutes period for house 1. Overall, almost 99% average comfort
has been achieved considering all houses together under LC-1. Similar results are
obtained for houses under LC-2.
3.4.2 Simulation settings and results with time-shiftable appliances
Simulation setup
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Table 3.5. Result for houses under LC-1
House
No.
AC EWH Total
reward
($)
min
temp
(° F)
max
temp
(° F)
cmft
(%)
min
temp
(° F)
max
temp
(° F)
cmft
(%)
1 70.15 74.76 100% 103.67 111.79 90% 1.38
2 70.15 74.89 100% 101.17 114.86 100% 1.36
3 69.61 74.45 100% 102.40 111.32 100% 0.944
4 70.05 76.65 100% 105.33 113.23 100% 1.096
5 65.64 72.19 100% 99.08 111.98 100% 0.896
6 65.15 71.90 100% 100.60 109.45 100% 0.892
7 67.41 74.35 100% 96.37 108.32 100% 0.592
8 70.32 76.42 100% 104.89 114.29 95% 1.384
9 65.48 72.16 100% 98.15 107.46 100% 0.98
10 70.15 74.89 100% 103.19 115.37 95% 1.544
For the simulation studies, total twenty-five houses and two LCs are considered. Ten
houses are under one LC and fifteen houses under the other. It is assumed that there are
five smart time-shiftable appliances in each house. Additionally, there are base loads
HVAC load (2.75 kW each [10]) and other loads considered from queue model load [29])
in each house, which are not controlled to reduce the demand. For the optimization, the
time-step is 15 minutes so that there are 96 time steps in 24 hours. The compensation rates
used are: C1 = 0.2, C2 = 0.3, and C3 = 0.5 $/kWh, which is comparable to the rewards
provided in [26]. However, a detailed survey would be required to estimate the
compensation rate which can actually motivate the consumers in the real world. Also, the
compensation rates should be realistic to the utility to conduct DR. The variable gap in
Equation (3.27) is taken as 3, i.e., 45 minutes. The weighed factor w is considered as 0.1
for all cases. The effect of varying w will be explored in future. There are two case studies:
one for the implementation of the proposed incentive-based load scheduling control and
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the other for the comparative study showing the savings in monthly electricity bill.
For the first case study, the load profile shown in Fig. 3.5 is considered for the
following day. The load profile comprises of all the time-shiftable appliances and base
loads of the 25 houses. All the time-shiftable appliances are used in all houses on this day,
but different houses have different schedules for their appliances. The schedules for
time-shiftable appliances are randomly generated within the given time-frame as
explained in Chapter 2. For the base loads, the HVAC load profiles are generated similar
to [10] while other loads are scaled down loads taken from [29]. It is assumed that there is
demand reduction event to reduce 12 kW peak demand from hour 19 to 21 on this day.
Fig. 3.6 represents the total as well as each individual LC’s shiftable loads profile. The
demand limit for the total shiftable appliances is 45 kW to reduce 12 kW peak load. It is
considered that the appliances with original schedules during the demand reduction period
have to be rescheduled within hour 18 to 24, i.e., we consider 6 hours in the optimization
to shift the loads around, although the demand reduction event is 2 hours.
Figure 3.5. Total load profile considering all houses loads for a day. It comprises of time-
shiftable appliances and other base loads.
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Figure 3.6. Load profiles of shiftable appliances only before optimization. Total shiftable
appliances and shiftable appliances under each LC are shown.
For the comparative study, two different scenarios are presented. First, all the
houses have same load schedules considering identical houses. There is slight variation in
the base load for each house. The oven-1, oven-2, and dishwasher are operated once
everyday while the cloth washer and dryer are operated three times a week. Second, all
the houses have different load schedules as well as different time-varying base load. In
this scenario, oven-1, oven-2, and dishwasher are operated once everyday while some
houses use the cloth washer and dryer once a week, some use twice, and some use thrice.
The total electricity consumption limit of an individual house is considered as 5 kW [12]
for TOU-based energy optimization. In TOU-based individual HEMS, the objective is to
minimize the electricity cost. Along with the individual house power consumption limit,
other constraints are Equations (3.24) to (3.27). In order to consider the inconvenience in
the TOU-based energy optimization, we have considered that an appliance is flexible to
shift within 3 hours before or after its base schedule. This will maintain the similar
environment settings for fair comparison of electricity cost. The total consumption limit
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for total twenty-five houses considered in the incentive-based optimization varies from
100 kW to 120 kW . It is assumed that the incentive-based demand reduction event occurs
every 2 days in a week [30]. The TOU price used here is adopted from [31]. According to
[31], the time-varying price is applied during the week days only and the flat rate
(off-peak price) is applied during the weekends. Three different TOU prices are provided,
i.e., off-peak price from 7 PM to 7 AM (6.5 cents/kWh), mid-peak price from 11 AM to 5
PM (9.5 cents/kWh), and on-peak price from 7 AM to 11 AM and 5 PM to 7 PM
(13.2 cents/kWh). This TOU rate is used for billing the electricity cost in order to make
fair comparison for all schemes, i.e., base case (no demand management), TOU-tariff
based home energy management scheme, and the proposed scheme.
Case studies and results discussion
The implementation of the proposed strategy and the electricity bill comparison
with the TOU-based energy optimization is demonstrated in this section.
Case I: Implementation of the framework with time-shiftable appliances control
Fig. 3.7 shows the total shiftable load profile after the optimization. The blue profile
is the total shiftable load, which is maintained within the limit after the optimization. The
yellow-colored and the purple-colored profiles are the shiftable load profiles of LC-1 and
LC-2 respectively. Compared to Fig. 3.6, the load profile during the considered time
changed for both the LCs. So, both LCs contributed to the demand management. The
individual potential of each LC for the required demand reduction can be better explained
with Fig. 3.8 and Fig. 3.9. Both LCs have different potential at different time instances as
represented by dotted-blue profile in both figures. Therefore, varying demand limit is
assigned to each of them for different time instances. The given demand reduction event
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time is from 7:00 PM to 9:00 PM.
Figure 3.7. Load profiles of shiftable appliances only after optimization. Total load is
within the prescribed limit.
From Fig. 3.8 and Fig. 3.9, it can be seen that the LCs have DRPs from 7:00 PM
only. It is because the appliances which start within the given demand reduction period are
only considered to contribute to the required demand reduction. According to their
original schedules, the appliances with DRP could be in operation even after the end of
demand reduction event time. Therefore, the LCs have cumulative DRP even after the
event end time. In Fig. 3.8 and Fig. 3.9, the dashed-red curves represent the total shiftable
load profile of respective LC before optimization and the solid-green curves represent the
total shiftable load profile of respective LC after the proposed optimization. The difference
between the dashed-red and solid-green curves within 7:00 PM to 9:00 PM in each figure
depicts the demand reduced within the given demand reduction period. The reduced loads
are actually shifted before and after the event time period as can be visualized by the
difference between the solid-green and dashed-red curves outside the event period.
Table 3.6 presents the result for some appliances of houses 5, 9, and 14 to clarify the
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Figure 3.8. Cumulative DRP, total shiftable power before and after the demand optimiza-
tion of the LC-1 for the considered demand reduction period.
Figure 3.9. Cumulative DRP, total shiftable power before and after the demand optimiza-
tion of the LC-2 for the considered demand reduction period.
inconvenience, time shift, and the compensation that each individual house has received.
The operating duration in the table represents the number of time steps (15 minutes each)
that the appliance will run. The first row in the table represents the house 5’s oven-2
which is controlled by LC-1. The time shift for this oven-2 is 3, which means it is shifted
by 45 minutes. This can be further observed from the difference between the old and new
start times. The compensation rate provided for shifting the operation of this oven-2 is
0.2$/kWh since the shift is less than 1 hour. Similarly, for the house 9 under the LC-1, the
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Table 3.6. Result showing inconvenience, time shift, and compensation
LC
House
no. Appliance
Operating
duration Inconvenience
Time
shift
Old start
time
New start
time
Compensation
rate ($/kWh)
Compensation
($)
1
5 Oven-2 6 18 3 77 80 0.2 0.71
9
Cloth
washer 3 0 0 77 77 0 1.49
Cloth
dryer 4 36 9 83 90 0.5
2 14
Cloth
washer 3 15 5 78 73 0.3 0.74
Cloth
dryer 4 8 2 84 82 0.2
cloth dryer is shifted but the cloth washer is not. Here, it can be observed that the gap
between the end of operation of cloth washer and the start of cloth dryer after the
optimization is more than 45 minutes which satisfies the running order constraint, i.e.,
Equation (3.27). This cloth dryer is shifted by 2 hours and 15 minutes, so the
compensation rate is 0.5$/kWh. House 9 receives $1.49 for shifting the operation of the
cloth dryer. Similarly, both the cloth washer and dryer of house 14 under the LC-2 are
shifted. In this case, the running order constraint is valid. The appliances of house 14 are
shifted ahead of the original schedule, which can be visualized from the total shiftable
load profile after optimization in Fig. 3.9. In this case study, the maximum inconvenience
is 36, which is due to the shifting of operation of the house 9’s cloth dryer. Similar results
are obtained for other houses which participated in the optimization. The total
compensation provided in this case is $14.4.
Case II: Comparison of monthly electricity cost
In case study II, the monthly electricity cost for the residential community is
calculated using the TOU tariff rate for two scenarios (all houses have same load profiles
and each house has a different load profile). Here, in each scenario, electricity
consumption costs for three scheme are calculated and compared. First, the electricity cost
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is calculated for base case where there is no demand management system and the
customers use their appliances according to their own schedule. Second, price-based
individual home energy management is employed for all 25 houses, i.e., each house try to
schedule its load during low price periods according to ones convenience. Third,
electricity cost is calculated considering the proposed incentive-based energy management
for the residential community.
Figure 3.10. Comparison of electricity costs of houses with identical load consumption
profile for a month due to the proposed incentive-based optimization with that due to TOU-
based optimization and without any optimization.
Identical houses with same power consumption: In this scenario, all 25 houses have
same energy consumption behavior and there is slight variation in the base load only.
Fig. 3.10 represents the monthly electricity cost calculated using the TOU tariff rate for all
the three schemes. It is clear that the electricity cost decreases when there is energy
optimization. The first bar (purple-colored) represents the first scheme which has the
highest electricity cost since in this scheme the customers use their appliances without
considering the tariff rate. The second bar (orange-colored) represents the cost with TOU
price-based individual energy management scheme. Comparing to the first scheme, this
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scheme saves the electricity bill by 6.5% on average which is $3.26. The maximum
savings is 6.75%. The third bar (green-colored) represents the cost with proposed
incentive-based optimization scheme which has the lowest electricity cost among the three
and saves $3.92 (7.8%) on average compared to the first scheme while the maximum
saving is 9.03%.
Houses with different power consumption: In this scenario, the power consumption
profile of all the houses are different from one another. Fig. 3.11 depicts the monthly
electricity consumption of all the houses calculated using the same TOU tariff rate for
different schemes. It can be observed that the electricity cost for any house is the least
with the proposed incentive-based energy optimization, represented by green bars in
Fig. 3.11. Compared to the base case, the electricity cost is less when the individual home
energy management is carried-out with the TOU-based optimization. The savings for the
individual houses is $2.5 on average which is 5.1% more than the base case. The
maximum saving with this scheme is 8.6%. While for the proposed incentive-based
optimization, the average saving is $5.5 (11.3%) and the maximum saving is 18.4% more
than the base case.
It should be noted that the tariff rate used for billing the electricity cost in this
comparative study is the same TOU tariff rate. In reality, the incentive-based programs are
applied with a flat tariff rate which will be close to the off-peak price. It could result in
further savings.
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Figure 3.11. Comparison of electricity costs of houses with different load consumption
profile for a month due to the proposed incentive-based optimization with that due to TOU-
based optimization and without any optimization.
3.5 Summary
The coordinated two-level demand response program with incentives is proposed
and implemented in this chapter. The feasibility to solve smart home energy management
is also studied and validated. In this proposed structure, the CC decides the total power
limit for all the smart appliances and has access to the DRP of LCs. The CC also provides
individual power consumption limit to the LCs based on their DRP ratio. The LCs use the
residents’ preference profile to operate the participants’ appliances, and calculate the
reward compensation accordingly. Two tasks are proposed and their implementation is
demonstrated. In the first task where TCLs are controlled, residents’ comfort level and
their willingness to go beyond the preferences will determine their reward rate. In addition
to the rewards provided, the participants will also be benefited with reduced electricity
bills. Thus, the results show that the proposed coordinated two-level system is effective
for residential home energy management considering reward incentives.
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In the second task, an incentive-based energy optimization method is proposed for
scheduling a number of residential time-shiftable electric appliances of a residential
community. A new incentives compensation is designed based on the level of
inconvenience to compensate the customers. The DRP of the appliances are identified
with a modified DRP definition so that only the potential appliances are considered into
the optimization. The proposed control structure makes the system scalable to large
number of houses and the customers information is kept private by including several LCs.
Thus, the proposed approach can be utilized in real-world system to achieve the benefits
of DR. Also, customers are motivated to participate in this type of demand reduction
programs since their inconvenience are considered and properly compensated with
financial incentives. The implementation of the proposed approach is demonstrated and
the electricity cost savings in a month basis due to this approach is compared with base
case and TOU-based optimization case. Results show that the proposed approach can save
the costs by 11.3% on average compared with the base case and also the proposed
approach can save 6.2% (on average) more than the TOU-based case considering the
similar environment settings for all cases.
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CHAPTER 4 LARGE SCALE RESIDENTIAL DEMAND MANAGEMENT
FRAMEWORK WITH NOVEL BIDDING STRATEGY AND
MARKET ANALYSIS
4.1 Overview
Residential electricity consumption accounts for 38% of the total electricity
consumption in the U.S. [3], making residential consumers a potential candidate for
demand reduction during peak hours. Financial incentives for the consumers are key to
encourage consumers to participate in such demand reduction events. There are different
demand reduction strategies (e.g., incentive-based and price-based techniques) to
encourage consumers to participate in the demand reduction events. One method for
achieving demand reductions is optimization algorithms/frameworks that are designed to
find a solution to efficiently meet the required criteria utilizing the available resources. For
example, in the case of electrical energy management, the optimization algorithm is
designed to find an efficient method to use electric appliances to match the total electricity
demand with the supply while satisfying the users’ needs 1.
In recent years, various energy optimization algorithms and approaches are
proposed in the literature. In [32], a heuristic combinatorial optimization algorithm was
proposed for load-leveling and demand reduction. An approximate dynamic programming
approach was proposed in [33] to solve the energy optimization problem in a microgrid.
1The project in this chapter is a joint work with Dr. Timothy M. Hansen and Prateek Munankarmi. I led the
task of overall formulation of the LC including appliance models, associated comfort level, continuous reward
structure, and LC optimization problem. Prateek led the task associated with CC including CC optimization
formulation, designing bidding structure for coordination of LCs, and collecting relevant data required for
the work. We both jointly worked on conducting the case study as well as analyzing the results of this work.
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A neural network was used in [34] to optimize data center operation and save energy
and money. The authors in [35] used deep reinforcement learning to perform online
optimization of schedules for building energy optimization. In [32]–[35], the focus was on
the energy optimization for non-residential sectors only, and so appliance level control
was not implemented.
Similarly, different control frameworks for smart communities and energy districts
have been studied in the literature. In [36], a novel cooperative distributed energy
scheduling algorithm for a smart grid was proposed. This distributed algorithm minimized
the total system day-ahead operating cost by optimally scheduling the
charging/discharging of energy storage devices, and the output of conventional generators.
Similarly in [37], authors investigated a contribution-based energy allocation policy
for trading energy among microgrids. A distributed model predictive control (MPC)
framework aggregated thermostatically controlled loads, such as EWH and AC, to provide
ancillary services is proposed in [38]. A Stackelberg game approach is introduced in [39]
for energy sharing management within a microgrid with PV prosumers. Authors in [40]
discussed a centralized MPC, and the authors in [41] and [42] proposed a distributed MPC
for coordination of networked microgrids to balance supply and demand. In [43], a
stochastic bi-level framework is proposed to coordinate microgrids, as well as consider the
stochastic nature of renewable energy. The research in this literature [36], [37], [40]–[43]
introduced novel control frameworks focusing on energy balance within and between
microgrids by optimally scheduling generation, storage, and/or flexible loads. Harnessing
the market-level economic benefit from the residential demand reduction while
considering both detailed appliance models and consumer incentives is not addressed in
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any single method [36]–[43].
The authors in [16] proposed a real-time price-based demand management for
residential appliances to minimize the daily expected electricity payment via stochastic
and robust optimization approaches. To address energy management for heating,
ventilation, and AC systems in multiple buildings, authors in [44] developed a novel
distributed optimization algorithm. In [45], the authors considered an abstract market
model for DR, and applied supply function bidding to match power supply and shape
electricity demand. The authors did not consider control of individual appliances for
satisfying the required demand reduction. Semi- and fully-automated energy scheduling
algorithms for residential DR were proposed in [46]. In [47], an optimal residential energy
scheduling framework was proposed which considered the trade-off between minimizing
the consumer electricity bill, and maximizing consumer utility. Different work
investigated time-varying price-based DR via controlling individual appliances within a
building to minimize the customers’ electricity costs [48]–[50]. With the increased
penetration of price-based home energy management systems presented in [16],
[44]–[50], there emerges a potential risk of synchronization of residential loads following
the same price signals. As all customers greedily optimize their respective electricity bills
by shifting their loads to low price periods, peak demand may occur at conventional
off-peak times. This may result in a volatile tariff in the market, discouraging residential
consumers to participate in such programs [51], [52].
Demand reduction for aggregated load demand has also been investigated in the
literature. In [51], a distributed direct load control scheme was proposed for large-scale
residential demand management, where the overall control was divided among each
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building’s energy management controller (EMC). The EMC in each building was
responsible for scheduling appliance operations to meet the local power consumption
target. The work in [28] presented a bi-level coordinated optimization strategy to reduce
the peak load demands considering online DR potential (DRP). Though aggregated load
control was proposed in [28], [51], they did not provide rewards to the residential
consumers for their participation. Similarly, in [53], a for-profit aggregator-based DR
program was proposed which scheduled residential appliances maintaining the consumer
preferences. Only non-thermal appliances were considered, and the potential privacy
concerns in this centralized framework were not discussed. In [54], a decentralized
approach to manage residential loads was proposed where an aggregator attempts to
maximize profits, and consumers minimize costs in response to time-varying prices. The
load aggregator further offers additional incentives to reduce the system overload.
A framework for the incentive-based residential demand aggregation was proposed
in [26]. Thermostatically controlled appliances, such as EWH and AC, were considered
and a concept of CI was introduced to account for the consumers’ discomfort. Although
the authors considered consumer comfort and incentivized the participating consumers
in [26], coordination mechanisms to address the sharing of demand reduction among the
aggregators were not incorporated. Moreover, the change in the load profile considering a
longer time horizon (e.g., rebound effect) was not presented. The discrete reward structure
in [26] causes computational intractability when the scale of system increases, which
inspired the authors to explore the alternative continuous reward structure in this work that
scales very well with increased system size.
There are several key elements in residential energy optimization research, such as
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proper allocation or coordination of the demand reduction, reward distribution for
incentivizing the consumers, identification of the demand reduction period, analysis of the
market-level economic benefit of such demand reduction, and consideration of detailed
residential appliance models. However, in the literature there is not a single framework
that incorporates each of these key elements to harness the economic benefits of
residential DR in a realistic, market-level scale. Thus, this chapter proposes a new
integrated hierarchical control framework for residential energy optimization,
coordinating and controlling large electric appliances and considering residents’ comfort
and supplying rewards. The main contributions of this work are:
• the introduction of a novel bidding scheme to coordinate the demand reduction
events between a CC, several LCs, and a number of residential consumers in a
hierarchical framework;
• the creation of a new continuous reward (incentive) for participating consumers
based on their comfort level; and
• the quantification of potential market-level benefits of the residential demand
reduction in terms of change in LMP and utility savings.
In the proposed hierarchical framework, a number of residential consumers are
grouped under an LC, which controls the consumers’ thermostatically controlled
appliances (such as EWH and AC) during the event. The LC is also responsible to
maintain consumers’ comfort, and reward them appropriately for their participation. Each
LC submits a number of bids (consisting of reward and power limit) to the CC. The CC
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selects the bid that optimally sets the demand limit for each LC. This framework presents
a demand reduction sharing technique among several LCs, which is not reported in
existing literature.
Furthermore, a new continuous reward (incentive) is designed for each participating
consumer based on their comfort level, e.g., if discomfort increases, then the reward
proportionally increases. The individual consumer’s comfort level is guided by one’s
preferences, therefore the designed continuous reward guarantees fair benefits for all
participants. In the proposed framework, the appropriate time period for performing
demand reduction is selected by performing optimal power flow (OPF) using realistic
market-based cost curves for generators, derived from generator offer data in an actual
U.S. electricity market, to imitate market behavior [55], [56]. The potential market-level
benefit of the residential demand reduction in terms of change in LMP and utility savings
is then quantified.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the proposed
hierarchical control framework along with the appliance model, consumer preferences,
reward structure, and the novel bidding process. Simulation setup and the results for a
case study are presented in Section 4.3. Finally, summary of the work is presented in
Section 4.4.
4.2 Hierarchical control framework with new bidding scheme
The proposed framework is from the perspective of an electric utility, where the
main goal is to fulfill the demand reduction by providing minimum rewards to the
consumers, while also ensuring consumer comfort during the demand reduction. The
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proposed hierarchical control framework consists of three layers. As shown in Fig. 4.1,
the bottom layer comprises the communication between residential consumers and LCs,
the interaction between the LCs and the CC constitutes the middle layer, and the top layer
interfaces the CC and electricity market.
Figure 4.1. System block diagram of the proposed hierarchical control structure for residen-
tial community energy optimization. It shows the components of the proposed hierarchical
framework, along with the information exchange between the components, represented by
arrows.
The privacy of consumer data is a major concern for the consumers participating in
demand reduction events. The proposed hierarchical framework ensures that the consumer
data (individual appliance usage profile and preferences) are shared only with the LCs,
minimizing such privacy concerns. The utility (CC) has access only to the aggregated
power consumption profile. On the other hand, the proposed framework also assures
scalability with a large number of residential consumers. It is assumed that there is no
significant communication delay for data exchange between layers. The design of the
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residential community, a new continuous reward, LC, CC, novel bidding strategy, and the
impacts on the electricity market are explained in detail in this section.
4.2.1 Residential community
Each house of the residential community is modeled with thermostatically
controlled loads (HVAC and EWH), explained in Chapter 2, and a non-controllable base
load. The base load is created using the queue model introduced in [29], where each home
has a unique time-varying load that statistically represent a known system load curve. A
residential community comprising of several homes is linked with an LC and participate
in the incentive-based demand reduction events. Each house shares its preferences and
load information only with its corresponding LC.
Consumer preferences and comfort indicator
The smart HVAC and EWH maintain the room and the water temperatures,
respectively, within a certain range. The temperature ranges for the operation of these
appliances are user-defined. Thus, the upper and lower temperature bounds for the normal
operation of both appliances are the preferences of the consumer. In addition to the
normal operating temperature range, the maximum and minimum allowable temperatures
during the time of demand reduction are also user-defined.
A consumer’s comfort level for the thermostatically controlled loads is mainly
associated with the temperature. So, the consumer’s thermal comfort level is measured in
terms of CI [26] as represented by Eq. (4.1).
CIa =
∣∣∣∣∣2Ta−T lowa −T highaT higha −T lowa
∣∣∣∣∣ (4.1)
where, for appliance a (e.g., AC or EWH), Ta is the instantaneous temperature, T
high
a is the
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upper temperature bound for normal operation, and T lowa is the lower temperature bound
for normal operation. The distance between the current temperature and the defined ideal
temperature is determined by CIa. The ideal temperature here is the mean of the upper and
lower temperature (consumer’s preferences) for normal operation. Since CI is defined as
the absolute value, it is always a positive value. If the CI is greater than 1, then it indicates
that the temperature is beyond the normal operating range. Meanwhile, the CI also helps
in choosing the appropriate appliance among the available appliances for the energy
optimization. Eq. (4.1) shows that the smaller the value of CI, the greater the potential of
the smart appliance to contribute to the demand reduction.
Here, let us consider an example of a consumer with an AC unit. The consumer
prefers the temperature of T lowAC to T
high
AC for the normal operation of the AC. The
temperature for normal operation of AC means that consumer’s room temperature is
maintained within T lowAC to T
high
AC at all times, except for demand reduction periods.
However, the AC may be turned off to reduce the power consumption during a demand
reduction period. In doing so, during the summer, the room temperature may increase
above T highAC . It is important to indicate the extent up to which the temperature can increase
or decrease for participating consumers. Thus, the minimum and maximum allowable
temperature, T minAC and T
max
AC , respectively, are required from the consumer to maintain their
comfort during the demand reduction period (with T minAC ≤ T lowAC , and T maxAC ≥ T highAC ). The
values of T minAC and T
max
AC bound the CI, and hence the consumer reward.
Furthermore, the consumer preferences for the temperature also signify their
willingness to compromise. If the consumer is concerned about being comfortable than
receiving more reward, then one will prefer a smaller range of allowable temperatures.
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Inversely, the consumer will opt for a larger range if they are more willing to compromise.
The reward scheme based on CI is described in the next section.
4.2.2 Continuous reward structure
A new continuous reward scheme for the demand reduction event is designed,
where consumer reward is directly proportional to the CI. The first advantage of the
continuous reward (compared to the discrete reward levels in [26]) is that it provides
fairness among participating consumers. As reward is proportional to the CI, a consumer
with higher discomfort receives a higher reward. Second, the continuous reward reduces
the optimization complexity by using continuous decision variables, as opposed to integer
variables as in [26], [57]. The continuous reward is expressed as Eq. (4.2), which is used
in the optimization.
Ra,t = r ·CIa,t ·Prateda ·∆t (4.2)
where, for appliance a at time t, r is the reward rate ($/kW ·min), CIa,t is the comfort
indicator, Prateda is the rated power (kW), and ∆t is the time interval considered (min).
After the optimization is performed, a post-processing step is performed to calculate the
actual reward given to consumers. Here, the actual reward amount is provided to
consumers only when CI exceeds 1 (i.e., their comfort is violated), as shown in Eq. (4.3).
Rewarda,t =

0, if CIa,t ≤ 1
r ·CIa,t ·Prateda ·∆t, if CIa,t > 1
(4.3)
This implies that a consumer will receive reward for time step t if the temperature at
that time is beyond the normal operating range. Based on the preferred temperature
settings of participating consumers, the CI is calculated. It should be noted that although it
seems that selecting a small range for the temperature preference would provide higher
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reward, the optimization selects appliances to contribute in the demand reduction that
requires minimal reward (as a main objective for the proposed framework is to provide the
minimum reward for a given demand reduction). Thus, in fact, the appliances having
higher temperature range have higher chances to participate in the optimization process
and receive rewards.
4.2.3 Local controller design
Each LC is responsible for coordinating the thermostatically controlled appliances
(AC and EWH) of a residential community during demand reduction events while
considering residential consumer comfort. The LCs have access to the local residential
consumer information regarding thermal appliance status and preferences. The algorithm
of an LC is presented in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: LC algorithm
1 Receive request from CC to submit bids (b = 1, . . . ,B)
2 To generate each bid (b):
a. Minimize Eq. (6) subject to Eqs. (1), (2), and (7)–(9), while keeping power
consumption within (pi,b)
b. Obtain control signals (δa,t) to optimize the operation of each consumer
appliance (a = 1, . . . ,A) for the given power consumption limit (pi,b)
3 Submit the bids (b = 1, . . . ,B) to CC
4 Wait for CC to complete Steps 3–6a in Algorithm 2
5 Receive selected bid from CC (Ri,PLi)
6 Based on the selected bid, dispatch:
a. Control signal (δa,t) to each consumer appliance (a = 1, . . . ,A)
b. Calculate reward for each consumer (Rewarda,t) using Eq. (5)
For a demand reduction event, the CC sends a demand reduction signal and requests
each LC to submit their bids to participate in the event. On receiving the signal from the
CC, each LC performs an optimization for several demand reductions (i.e., different
power reduction amounts) to generate respective bids. Each bid compromises a reward
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amount corresponding to a certain demand reduction. For each bid, an LC performs a
MILP optimization to calculate the optimal reward for a specific power limit. The main
objective of the LC optimization is to minimize the total reward for each bid.
Mathematically, the objective of LC can be expressed by Eq. (4.4).
RWi,b = min
δa,t
τ
∑
t=1
A
∑
a=1
r ·CIa,t ·Prateda ·∆t (4.4)
Subject to
CIa,t =
∣∣∣∣∣2Ta,t −T lowa −T highaT higha −T lowa
∣∣∣∣∣ , ∀ t = 1, . . . ,τ (4.5)
A
∑
a=1
Prateda ·δa,t +Pbasei,t ≤ pi,b , ∀ t = 1, . . . ,τ (4.6)
T mina ≤ Ta,t ≤ T maxa , ∀ t = 1, . . . ,τ (4.7)
and other appliance model constraints including Eqs. (2.1) and (2.3), and (2.2). Eq. (4.5)
calculates the CI for each consumer, Eq. (4.6) ensures that the total power consumption of
the residential consumers under each LC does not exceed their bidding power, and
Eq. (4.7) ensures that the temperature does not exceed the resident defined minimum and
maximum temperature.
Here, RWi,b is the continuous reward corresponding to bid b for LC i, δa,t is the
ON/OFF status of appliance a at time t, Ta,t is the temperature of to appliance a at time t,
A is the total number of appliances under LC i, τ is the total time considered, Pbasei,t is the
total base power of LC i at time t, pi,b is the power limit corresponding to bid b for LC i,
and T mina and T
max
a are the minimum and maximum allowable temperature for the
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operation of appliance a, respectively. The main decision variable for optimization is δa,t .
4.2.4 Central controller design
The CC is responsible for coordinating several LCs for residential community
energy optimization when demand reduction is considered appropriate for the system
(technically or economically). The CC can be represented by the utility itself, or another
independent entity. The algorithm for the CC is presented in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: CC algorithm
1 Receive demand reduction request signal from market
2 Request all LCs to submit their bids
3 Gather all bids (bi = 1, . . . ,Bi) from the LCs (i = 1, . . . ,N), i.e, Steps 2 and 3 of
Algorithm 1
4 Calculate optimal bid for each LC by minimizing Eq. (10) subject to constraints
(11)–(14)
5 Obtain optimal values for ωi,b to determine reward Ri and demand limit PLi for each
LC
6 Dispatch:
a. Optimal bids to each LC, i.e., set power limit (PLi) to each LC and distribute
reward (Ri)
b. Inform market of the reduced demand
On receiving the demand reduction request signal from the market, the CC requests
each LC to submit respective bids. After the LCs submit their bids, the CC performs a
MILP optimization to select the optimal bid from each LC to minimize the total cost of
performing the demand reduction. The optimal bid for each LC comprises the total
demand reduction of each LC, and the corresponding reward that each LC calculates for
its customers’ participation. The CC then sends the selected optimal bid for each
individual LC with information about the demand reduction and reward to each LC.
The objective of the CC is to minimize the total reward payment to the residential
consumers while satisfying the required demand reduction. Mathematically, the objective
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of the CC can be expressed as Eq. (4.8).
min
ωi,b
N
∑
i=1
Ri (4.8)
Subject to:
B
∑
b=1
ωi,b = 1 ∀ i = 1, . . . ,N (4.9)
Ri =
B
∑
b=1
ωi,b×RWi,b ∀ i = 1, . . . ,N (4.10)
PLi =
B
∑
b=1
ωi,b× pi,b ∀ i = 1, . . . ,N (4.11)
N
∑
i=1
PLi ≤ Plimit ∀ i = 1, . . . ,N (4.12)
Here, Ri is the optimal reward for LC i, ωi,b is a binary decision variable
corresponding to bid b of LC i, PLi is the optimal demand limit for LC i, Plimit is the total
power limit for all LCs, and N is the total number of LCs. Eq. (4.9) ensures that only one
bid is selected from each LC, Eq. (4.10) provides the selected reward for each LC,
Eq. (4.11) computes the selected power limit of each LC, and Eq. (4.12) guarantees that
the total power consumption of all residential consumers under all LCs is within the
prescribed total limit.
4.2.5 Novel bidding strategy
The proposed novel bidding strategy determines the demand limit allocation to each
LC. Each LC prepares its several bids. Each bid compromises a reward amount
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corresponding to a certain demand reduction. Among the several bids prepared by the LC,
one bid is selected by the CC.
To illustrate LC bidding strategy, let us consider LC X preparing B bids. For the first
bid, LC X minimizes consumer reward RWX ,1 considering consumer comfort for a
particular demand reduction pX ,1. After optimization, LC X prepares the first bid as
[RWX ,1, pX ,1]. Similarly, LC X arranges the rest of the B−1 bids. The LC then submits
the B bids ([RWX ,1, pX ,1], . . . , [RWX ,B, pX ,B]) to the CC.
Let us assume the CC notifies LC X that bid i ([RWX ,i, pX ,i]) is selected among the
submitted bids, i.e., the demand limit for the LC is pX ,i. The LC then dispatches the
control signal to each resident appliance based on bid B, and distributes reward (RWX ,i) to
the consumers for their participation.
To illustrate the bid selection process by CC, let us consider a CC with two LCs (X
and Y ). Considering each LC submits B bids i.e., ([RWX ,1, pX ,1], . . . , [RWX ,B, pX ,B]) and
([RWY,1, pY,1], . . . , [RWY,B, pY,B]), the CC selects the optimal bid for each LC that satisfies
the power limit (Plimit) at the minimum reward. Suppose the optimal bids are bid i for LC
X ([RWX ,i, pX ,i]), and bid j for LC Y ([RWY, j, pY, j]). The CC then sends the
corresponding demand limits (pX ,i for LC X and pY, j for LC Y ) and the reward (RWX ,i and
RWj) to the respective LCs.
4.2.6 Impacts on electricity market
In this work, the method employed in [55] is used to emulate the LMP of an actual
U.S. electricity market. In [55], an unsupervised learning technique classifies real
generators based on the offer data submitted by the generators to the PJM market.
65
Realistic market-based generator cost curves are obtained by fitting the quadratic cost
curve for each generator cluster. These market-based cost curves are used for the
calculation of OPF, providing the LMP of each bus of the system that represents the actual
PJM energy market.
In this work, LMP is calculated for two cases: (i) with demand reduction, and (ii)
without demand reduction, for each hour. The reduction of LMP of each bus, as well as
the total utility savings for each hour, are then computed to see the economic impact of the
demand reduction. Only those hours in which there is the significant reduction in the LMP
and significant utility savings considering the reward are considered appropriate demand
reduction periods. On selecting the suitable demand reduction period, the market then
sends information about the reduction in LMP and requests for the demand reduction to
the CC. After the CC performs the demand reduction, it sends the information on reduced
demand to the market.
4.3 Experimental setup and results discussion
Environment settings
The RBTS 6-bus system [58], a test case shown in Fig. 4.2, is considered in this
work. This test case has 6 buses with a total generation capacity of 240 MW. The bus
loads are scaled according to PJM load to replicate the actual behavior of the PJM
electricity market, as described in [55]. In this work, it is assumed that a single utility
supplies electricity to all loads of each of the 6 buses. The utility payment, calculated
based on the LMP calculated by OPF, is determined before and after demand reduction to
evaluate the economic benefit of the demand reduction. In this work, 30% of the total load
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is considered to be residential [59]. Among the residential load, the utility assumes that
20% of the loads can be controlled and thus calculates the demand reduction for each
hour. This amount of load, which is approximately 6% of the total demand, was chosen as
it represents the amount of demand used in actual DR events in PJM [60].
Figure 4.2. RBTS system with the location of the loads and maximum generation limits of
the system [61].
The residential houses are assumed to be on bus 5 of the test system. A CC with 60
LCs, with varying numbers of homes between 10 to 30 under each LC, are considered in
the case study. It is assumed that each LC generates 7 bids by keeping its total power
consumption within 70% to 100% of its peak power demand, with a step change of 5%.
Altogether 1,200 residential houses were considered in this study.
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The consumer preferences for the temperatures are randomly generated within a
specific range. The lower and upper temperature bounds for the normal operation of the
AC are randomly selected within 68◦F to 70◦F and 73◦F to 75◦F, respectively. Similarly,
the minimum and maximum allowable room temperatures are randomly chosen within
60◦F to 65◦F and 80◦F to 84◦F, respectively. Likewise, for the EWH the lower
temperature and upper temperature for normal operation, and the minimum and maximum
allowable water temperatures are randomly chosen within 105◦F to 108◦F, 118◦F to
122◦F, 90◦F to 103◦F, and 125◦F to 130◦F, respectively. Note that these are typical
realistic values, and each individual consumer has different settings. The initial room and
water temperatures are randomly initialized within 69◦F to 74◦F, and 110◦F to 118◦F,
respectively. The initial status for all the appliances are randomly set as 1 (ON) or 0
(OFF). The reward rate is considered as 0.04 $/kW · min [26].
A hot summer day (7/1/2014) is chosen to conduct the demand reduction. The
realistic residential water use schedule for the EWH model is generated from [62],
whereas the outdoor temperature for an HVAC model is obtained from typical
meteorological year (TMY3) weather format of Chicago, IL, to correlate with the PJM
market data. Unique time-varying base load was created for each house using the Mt/G/∞
queue model from [29]. The queue model statistically creates individual house loads
based on a reference load derived from a known system load curve. For this simulation,
load from PJM for July 1, 2014 [63], was scaled down to the reference load representing a
single household using a minimum and maximum load of 100 W and 5000 W,
respectively, according to [29] for use in the queue model. The rest of the load on bus 5 of
RBTS was scaled from the PJM load according to [55].
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The simulation is performed using MATLAB R2017b and CPLEX 12.7.1. The
relative MIP gap in CPLEX, a relative difference between the best bound and the found
feasible solution, is set as 10% for optimization in LC and default 0.01% for optimization
in CC.
Result discussion
The savings to the utility due to the demand reduction in each hour of the simulation
day (7/1/2014) is represented in Fig. 4.3, which is obtained from the OPF for the two
cases of with and without demand reduction. From the figure, it can be seen that
conducting demand reduction of approximately 1.2 MW from 2 to 3 pm in the afternoon
could save $39,359 and decrease the LMP from 294.11 $/MWh to 80.62 $/MWh. Due to
network configuration and generator configuration (generator size and scheduling), there
is no significant saving for conducting demand reduction for any other period. With this
information, 2 to 3 pm on this day was chosen as the appropriate time to perform the
demand reduction study.
The residential community load profile for the day without demand reduction,
generated using the initial conditions and base load information explained above in
Section 4.3, is shown in Fig. 4.4. This load profile represents the total load of the
participating residential consumers only (the remaining load comes from the scaled PJM
load). The demand reduction event period (2 to 3 pm) is marked within the black-dashed
rectangle. The green curve represents the total load profile of the participating houses, i.e.,
combination of base, HVAC, and EWH loads. The red curve represents the total base
loads, which cannot be controlled. The blue curve represents the total HVAC and EWH
loads, i.e., controllable loads for demand reduction.
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Figure 4.3. Total utility savings from demand reduction in each hour. The blue bar graph
depicts the total utility saving each hour from the peak demand reduction, which is shown
by the red curve.
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Figure 4.4. Normal load profiles for HVAC and EWH load, baseload, and total load. The
one hour interval within the black dashed rectangle represents the demand reduction period.
For the explanation of the bids from an LC during the demand reduction event, an
example bid from LC-2, corresponding to 10 homes, is represented by Fig. 4.5. A total of
B = 7 bids are offered, as explained in Section 4.3. The first bid is zero reward for zero
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demand reduction (i.e., the LC is not selected for demand reduction), while the last bid is
$160.20 for 16.94 kW peak demand reduction. From the figure, it can be observed that the
total reward increases with the increasing peak demand reduction. In this particular case
of LC-2, for the last bid, the minimum and maximum rewards given to the consumers are
$0 and $16.59, respectively. The consumers with higher priority for comfort (i.e., by
selecting smaller range of temperature), received lower rewards compared to consumers
more willing to compromise.
Figure 4.5. An example of different bids submitted by LC-2.
Table 4.1. Total utility reward and mean and standard deviation for consumer reward for
different demand reduction cases
Case
Total peak
reduction (MW)
Total utility
reward ($)
Average utility
reward ($/kW)
Mean of
consumer reward ($)
Standard deviation of
consumer reward ($)
Maximum
consumer reward ($)
Case-I 0.4 958.15 1.37 0.77 2.39 15.72
Case-II 0.6 3041.21 3.38 2.42 4.80 16.95
Case-III 0.8 5418.70 4.92 4.55 6.66 25.01
Case-IV 1.0 8012.40 6.16 6.91 7.46 25.01
Case-V 1.2 11002.51 7.33 9.37 7.75 25.01
Several demand reduction cases from 0.4 MW to 1.2 MW peak demand reduction
are considered. The results for total rewards distributed to the consumers by CC, as well
as the mean and standard deviation of the reward distribution, are presented in Table 4.1.
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Figure 4.6. Total utility savings before and after rewards for different demand reductions.
Considering Case-V, the total reward that the utility has to pay to the consumers is
$11,002 for 1.2 MW total peak demand reduction. In terms of $/kW, it is 7.33 $/kW,
which means the utility pays $7.33 on average for reducing 1 kW of peak demand. The
minimum and maximum reward distributed to the consumers are 0 and $25.01,
respectively, for the one hour demand reduction. Moreover, the mean and standard
deviation of the consumer reward is $9.37 and $7.75, respectively. From this table, it can
be observed that the average and the standard deviation of the reward to the consumers
increases with the increasing demand reduction.
Fig. 4.6 presents the net savings to the utility for different cases of demand
reduction. The upper line represents the total utility savings without considering reward,
and the lower line represents the net utility savings after providing the consumer reward.
The blue region between the lines represents the reward provided. For the case of 1.2 MW,
after considering the reward provided to the residential consumer and the decrease in LMP
after the demand reduction event, the total net savings of the utility is $28,217. For other
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cases, assuming the utility savings from residential demand reduction is proportional to its
contribution to the total demand reduction, the utility can have significant savings by
conducting the residential demand reduction. In such cases though, the fraction of the
total demand reduction is fulfilled by other resources (i.e., not through the hierarchical
framework) to harness significant savings.
The residential consumers’ load profile before and after demand reduction event is
presented in Fig. 4.7. It can be seen that the load profile of the participating consumers
during the demand reduction remains below the power limit set by the CC. After the
demand reduction period, the peak load consumption compared to the baseline profile
increases, indicating a rebound effect that can be observed. This rebound effect seen
immediately after the end of demand reduction event is due to most of the residential
appliances simultaneously starting after the demand reduction period ends to return
towards the temperature bounds. However, this increased rebound did not cause
significant additional costs to the utility, as it caused minimal increases in LMP compared
to the savings during the demand reduction period.
Comparing the reward of the proposed framework with the rewards provided by
existing utilities, Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) [64] offers 16.30 $/kW, whereas
Southern California Edison (SCE) [65] offers 16.78 $/kW to third-party aggregators for
the month of July. Based on these rates, the total reward would be approximately $20,000
for 1.2 MW of the demand reduction. With the proposed framework, the total reward
distributed among the consumers is $11,002 for reducing 1.2 MW peak demand, which is
significantly lower than the existing utility reward. The economic viability of the 0.04
$/kW · min reward rate for motivating the consumer will be considered in future work.
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Figure 4.7. Load profile of the residential consumers before and after demand reduction
event. The red line represents the load profile before demand reduction, and the green line
represents the load profile after demand reduction.
4.4 Summary
This chapter presents a novel hierarchical framework for a large-scale residential
energy optimization. The proposed hierarchical framework ensures algorithm scalability,
as well as maintains the privacy of the residential consumers. The results presented show
that both the consumers and the utility are benefited from the proposed incentive-based
energy optimization. From a consumer’s perspective, the proposed reward is flexible,
where one can choose to get more reward for providing thermal flexibility of appliances,
or can remain within a desired comfort region receiving less reward. This is evidenced
from the minimum and maximum reward consumers received in the results, i.e., $0 and
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$25. Additionally, consumer appliance usage and preference data are kept private within
an LC, which ensures consumer privacy. On the other hand, the utility can save a large
amount by conducting the demand reduction just for one hour, which is evident from the
$28,217 net savings shown in the result for reducing 1.2 MW peak demand. Furthermore,
the load profile after the demand reduction event is analyzed to observe the rebound effect.
The net saving of the utility is also calculated after considering the consumer reward and
increase in LMP due to rebound peak.
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS
The residential demand management strategies rewarding consumers and
considering their comfort and preferences were designed and implemented. The models of
the appliances which can be controlled to contribute in demand reduction were
implemented. A framework for the demand reduction employing the DRP approach to
allocate the demand limit was developed and implemented. Two case studies were
conducted to demonstrate the feasibility and implementation of this framework. From the
first case study where the HVAC and EWH of the consumers were controlled, the results
demonstrated that in addition to achieving the required demand reduction, the consumers’
comfort were maintained as per their willingness and they were rewarded accordingly.
The second case study investigated the contribution of time-shiftable appliances in the
demand reduction at the required time. The new incentives compensation designed based
on the level of inconvenience was provided to the consumers. Furthermore, the results
showed the proposed approach can save the electricity costs by 11.3% on average
compared with the base case (where there is no energy optimization) and also the
proposed approach can save 6.2% (on average) more than the TOU-based demand
management case considering the similar environment settings for all cases.
On the other hand, a three-level hierarchical framework for the demand reduction
from large number of residential consumers was investigated, where a novel bidding
strategy was developed and the electricity market analysis was included. The designed
framework ensures algorithm scalability, as well as maintains the privacy of the residential
consumers. The results showed that both the consumers and the utility were benefited
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from the proposed incentive-based energy optimization. From a consumer’s perspective,
the proposed reward was flexible, where one could choose to get more reward for
providing thermal flexibility of appliances, or could remain within a desired comfort
region receiving less reward. This was evidenced from the minimum and maximum
reward consumers received in the results, i.e., $0 and $25. On the other hand, from the
market analysis the utility’s net savings was $28,217 by conducting the demand reduction
just for one hour, where 1.2 MW peak demand was reduced.
Therefore, in conclusion, the residential demand management can contribute to the
demand reduction, which can benefit the consumers as well as the utility. Meanwhile, the
identification of suitable demand reduction time can provide significant financial benefits
to the utility. In order to encourage the consumers to participate, providing incentives and
ensuring consumers’ comfort play a vital role. In this regard, the incentives should be
appropriate enough to motivate the consumers and should not affect the minimum savings
required to the utility. So, identifying the proper method to estimate the appropriate
incentives is a future work to this work. Also, incorporating the rooftop photovoltaic
systems with the proposed demand management strategies could increase the benefits to
the consumers, which can be explored in future.
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